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In the crossmodal signals paradigm (CSP) participants are instructed to respond to a set
of stimuli from different modalities, presented more or less simultaneously, as soon as a
stimulus from any modality has been detected. In the focused attention paradigm (FAP),
on the other hand, responses should only be made to a stimulus from a pre-defined target
modality and stimuli from non-target modalities should be ignored. Whichever paradigm is
being applied, a typical result is that responses tend to be faster to crossmodal stimuli than
to unimodal stimuli, a phenomenon often referred to as “crossmodal interaction.” Here,
we investigate predictions of the time-window-of-integration (TWIN) modeling framework
previously proposed by the authors. It is shown that TWIN makes specific qualitative and
quantitative predictions on how the two paradigms differ with respect to the probability
of multisensory integration and the amount of response enhancement, including the
effect of stimulus intensity (“inverse effectiveness”). Introducing a decision-theoretic
framework for TWIN further allows comparing the two paradigms with respect to the
predicted optimal time window size and its dependence on the prior probability that
the crossmodal stimulus information refers to the same event. In order to test these
predictions, experimental studies that systematically compare crossmodal effects under
stimulus conditions that are identical except for the CSP-FAP instruction should be
performed in the future.
Keywords: focused attention, cross-modal, time-window-of-integration, Bayesian decision theory, exponential
distribution
1. INTRODUCTION
In the crossmodal signals paradigm1 (CSP) participants are
instructed to respond to a set of stimuli from different modali-
ties, presented more or less simultaneously, as soon as a stimulus
from any modality has been detected. In the focused attention
paradigm (FAP), on the other hand, responses should only be
made to a stimulus from a pre-defined target modality and stimuli
from non-target modalities should be ignored. Thus in FAP, but
not in CSP, participants are required to distinguish between target
and non-target modality. Whichever paradigm is being applied,
a typical result is that responses tend to be faster to crossmodal
stimuli than to unimodal stimuli, a phenomenon often referred to
as “intersensory (or crossmodal) interaction,” already reported in
Todd (1912). Many attempts have been made on both the behav-
ioral and neurophysiological level to understand the dynamics
of mechanisms that underlie these crossmodal effects (cf. Stein,
2012, for a recent overview). Up to now, however, reaction time
models have predominantly been concerned with CSP. The pur-
pose of this paper is to demonstrate how both types of paradigm
can be accounted for within the time-window-of-integration
1The terms “redundant targets” or “redundant signals” paradigm are more
common but do not explicitly refer to stimuli coming from different sensory
modalities.
(TWIN) modeling framework proposed by the authors (Colonius
and Diederich, 2004; Diederich and Colonius, 2004). Moreover,
we will extend the decision-making framework for TWIN to
include both CSP and FAP. Under appropriate empirical restric-
tions, TWIN predicts crossmodal interaction effects in one of
the paradigms (CSP, say) given crossmodal interaction effects
observed in the other (FAP). While permitting a stringent test of
this modeling framework by comparing the implementation of
CSP and FAP in TWIN, we moreover strive to get a deeper under-
standing of the cognitive processes elicited by these two different
crossmodal paradigms.
The classic explanation for a speed-up of responses to cross-
modal stimuli in CSP has been that subjects start preparing a
response as soon as the first stimulus has been detected (Raab,
1962). Taking detection times to be random variables and adding
some technical assumptions, observed reaction time is repre-
sented as the minimum of the reaction times to, say, visual and
auditory signals leading to a purely statistical facilitation effect
(probability summation) in response speed. Numerous studies
have shown that this separate activation or race model is not suffi-
cient to explain the observed speedup in reaction time, however,
(see Diederich and Colonius, 2004, for a review). Using the race
model inequality (RMI) (Miller, 1982; Colonius and Diederich,
2006) as a benchmark test, responses to bimodal stimuli have
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 62 | 1
INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Colonius and Diederich Focused attention vs. crossmodal signals paradigm
been found to be faster than predicted by statistical facilitation,
in particular, when the stimuli were spatially aligned. Although
the RMI test has sometimes been applied to data from both types
of paradigm, its validity for FAP data seems problematic as long
as no specific assumptions about the effect of a stimulus from the
non-target modality winning the race are being made. Moreover,
the racemodel gives no explanation for the decrease in facilitation
observed with variations inmany crossmodal stimulus properties,
e.g., increasing spatial disparity between the stimuli.
An alternative model type coactivation models assumes that
activation, raised in different sensory channels by presenting
crossmodal stimuli, is combined to satisfy a single criterion for
response initiation (Miller, 1982). Coactivation models predict
faster average reaction time to multiple stimuli compared to sin-
gle stimuli because the combined activation reaches that criterion
faster. Mathematical instantiations of this model type include
superposition or counter models (Schwarz, 1989; Diederich and
Colonius, 1991; Diederich, 1995) and diffusion models (Schwarz,
1994; Diederich, 1995). Although these models have been quite
successful in describing various empirical data sets for CSP,
they have as yet no provision to deal with FAP. Note that nei-
ther coactivation nor race models can predict inhibition, i.e.,
sometimes responses to crossmodal stimuli are slower than to
unimodal ones.
2. TIME WINDOW OF INTEGRATION MODELING
FRAMEWORK: GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The time-window hypothesis holds that information from dif-
ferent sensory modalities must not be presented too far apart
in time so that integration into a multisensory perceptual unit
may occur. The concept, already mentioned over 20 years ago
(Meredith et al., 1987; Stein andMeredith, 1993), recently enjoyed
increasing popularity on both the neural and behavioral levels
of observation (e.g., Lewald et al., 2001; Meredith, 2002; Lewald
and Guski, 2003; Spence and Squire, 2003; Wallace et al., 2004;
Bell et al., 2005, 2006; Navarra et al., 2005; Romei et al., 2007;
Rowland and Stein, 2007; Rowland et al., 2007; Van Wassenhove
et al., 2007; Musacchia and Schroeder, 2009; Powers et al., 2009;
Royal et al., 2009). Although a “window of integration” has pre-
viously been defined for both spatial and temporal aspects of a
crossmodal experiment (e.g., Wallace et al., 2004) and has even
been suggested for higher-level aspects like semantic congruity
(e.g., van Atteveldt et al., 2007), we will confine discussion to the
temporal dimension within the reaction time context considered
here. To the best of our knowledge, however, the TWIN model
framework) is the only effort to develop an explicit quantitative
rendering of a crossmodal time-window mechanism (Colonius
and Diederich, 2004, 2012) and to introduce a decision-theoretic
perspective on predicting an optimal time window (Colonius and
Diederich, 2011).
Given that the basic concept of a “race” among neural activi-
ties elicited in separate peripheral sensory pathways, i.e., at a very
early stage of processing, has considerable intuitive plausibility,
the TWIN model retains this concept which is central to separate
activation models. The first stage is complemented by a subse-
quent compound stage of converging processes which comprise
neural integration of the input and preparation of a response.
This second stage is defined by default: it includes all later, pos-
sibly temporally overlapping, processes that are not part of the
peripheral processes in the first stage.
The central assumption of the model concerns the temporal
configuration needed for multisensory integration to occur:
[TWIN assumption] Multisensory integration occurs only if all
peripheral processes of the first stage terminate within a given tem-
poral interval, the “time window of integration.”
Thus, the window acts as a “filter” determining whether or not
afferent information delivered from different sensory organs is
registered close enough in time to trigger multisensory integra-
tion. Passing the filter is necessary but not sufficient for cross-
modal interaction to occur since the amount of interaction may
also depend on several other aspects of the stimulus setting, like
spatial configuration of the stimuli. The amount of crossmodal
interaction manifests itself in an increase or decrease of second
stage processing time but it is assumed not to depend on how
far apart in time the stimuli have been presented (stimulus onset
asynchrony, SOA).
For FAP, the TWIN assumption is further constrained in one
important respect:
[FAP condition] Crossmodal interaction in FAP only occurs if (i) a
non-target stimulus wins the race in the first stage opening the time
window of integration, such that (ii) the termination of the target
peripheral process falls into the window.
One interpretation is that a winning non-target will keep the
system in a state of heightened reactivity such that the upcoming
target stimulus, if it falls into the time window, will trigger cross-
modal interaction. For saccadic eye movements, for example, this
may correspond to a gradual inhibition of fixation neurons (in
superior colliculus) and/or omnipause neurons (inmidline pontine
brain stem). If a stimulus from the target modality is the winner
of the race in the peripheral channels, second stage processing is
initiated without any multisensory integration mechanism being
involved.
Although these TWINmodel assumptions clearly oversimplify
matters, the framework generates several experimentally testable
predictions, some of which have already found empirical support
in recent studies (cf. Diederich and Colonius, 2007a,b, 2008a,b).
Since physically identical stimuli can be presented in both FAP
and CSP under the same spatiotemporal configuration, any sys-
tematic differences observed in the corresponding reaction times
have to be due to the instructions being different. Thus, differ-
ences between the two paradigms may allow one to assess, and
possibly separate from one another, the contribution of top-down
processes and bottom-up processes in multisensory integration.
3. THE FORMAL PRESENTATION OF TWIN FOR FAP
AND CSP
For the crossmodal condition, the race in the first stage is based
on postulating statistically independent, non-negative continu-
ous randomvariables representing the durations of the peripheral
processes. With V and A denoting these visual and auditory
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processing times 2, respectively, the central TWIN assumption
introduced above translates into
|V − A| < ω, (1)
i.e., peripheral processes V and A terminate within an integration
window of width ω. This inequality is the condition for the event
of integration to occur in the case of CSP, denoted ICSP, and it is
obviously equivalent to the union of the events
{V < A < V + ω} ∪ {A < V < A + ω} ≡ ICSP.
For the FAP with, say, the visual as target modality, the condition
for integration is, by translating the FAP condition stated above,
IFAP = {A < V < A + ω}.
Therefore, under identical stimulus conditions,
IFAP ≡ ICSP ∩ {A is the winner of the race}.
It follows that any realization of the peripheral processing times
V and A that leads to an opening of the time window under
the focused attention instruction also leads to that event under
the crossmodal signals instruction, i.e., IFAP ⊂ ICSP. Thus, the
probability of integration under crossmodal signals instruction
can not be smaller than that under focused attention instruction:
Pr(IFAP) ≤ Pr(ICSP), given identical stimulus conditions hold.
3.1. EXPECTED CROSSMODAL REACTION TIME FOR FAP AND CSP
Although events IFAP and ICSP are not empirically observable, the
numerical ordering of their associated probabilities leads to a cor-
responding prediction about mean crossmodal reaction times.
Indeed, according to the two-stage assumption, total reaction
time in the crossmodal condition can be written as a sum of two
random variables:
RTVA = W1 + W2, (2)
whereW1 andW2 refer to first and second stage processing times,
respectively. With Pr(I) the probability that integration occurs in
CSP or FAP, expected saccadic reaction time in the crossmodal
condition (E[RTVA]) then is:
E[RTVA] = E[W1] + E[W2]
= E[W1] + Pr[I]E[W2|I] + (1 − Pr[I])E[W2|not-I]
= E[W1] + E[W2|not-I]
− Pr[I](E[W2|not-I] − E[W2|I]),
2For simplicity, we are using V and A for the crossmodal condition in the
remainder of this paper, although this could be replaced by any other pair of
modalities. Moreover, without losing much generality—since non-zero SOA
values can be subsumed as additive constants under V or A—we suppress any
reference to values of SOA different from zero.
where E[W2|I] and E[W2|not-I] denote the expected second stage
processing time conditioned on interaction occurring (I) or not
occurring (not-I), respectively. Putting
 ≡ E[W2|not-I] − E[W2|I],
this becomes
E[RTVA] = E[W1] + E[W2|not-I] − Pr[I] · . (3)
The term Pr[I] ·  can be interpreted as a measure of the expected
saccadic RT interaction effect in the second stage with positive 
values corresponding to facilitation, negative ones to inhibition.
The duration of the first stage, W1, must be defined differently
for CSP and FAP:
W1 =
{
min(V,A) for CSP,
V for FAP,
(4)
assuming the visual as target modality in FAP. Thus, for the
expected overall reaction time in the crossmodal condition
E[RTVA] =
{
E[min(V,A)] + μ − P(ICSP) · , for CSP,
E[V] + μ − P(IFAP) · , for FAP, (5)
with μ ≡ E[W2|not-I].
The last equation allows to predict how (observable) mean
reaction times for FAP and CSP may differ. In fact, under iden-
tical stimulus conditions and assuming facilitation occurs (i.e.,
 > 0), expected crossmodal reaction time can never be longer
in CSP than in FAP because both E[min(V,A)] ≤ E[V] and
Pr(IFAP) ≤ Pr(ICSP). Thus,
E[RTVA|CSP] ≤ E[RTVA| FAP].
Some empirical support for this prediction was found in an
unpublished experiment from our lab, but further empirical
testing is required.
3.2. CROSSMODAL RESPONSE ENHANCEMENT FOR FAP AND CSP
In the unimodal condition, no interaction is possible. Thus,
E[RTunimodal] = E[W1] + E[W2|not-I]. (6)
Note that in order to relate processing durations in the unimodal
conditions to those occurring in the crossmodal conditions, one
has to introduce a basic assumption, known as “context inde-
pendence” or “context invariance” (cf. Ashby and Townsend,
1986; Luce, 1986; Colonius, 1990; Townsend and Eidels, 2011).
Informally, it amounts to assuming that the (marginal) distri-
butions of random variables (like V and A) occurring in the
crossmodal conditions are identical to the distributions of the
corresponding random variables occurring in the unimodal con-
ditions. Although not empirically testable, context invariance has
been widely accepted as a plausible modeling constraint and will
be used here as well.
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In analogy to measuring multisensory enhancement in neural
responses (cf. Meredith and Stein, 1986; Anastasio et al., 2000),
the amount of crossmodal reaction time interaction is measured
by relating mean RT in the crossmodal condition to that in
the unimodal conditions. The following definition quantifies the
percent RT enhancement (Diederich and Colonius, 2004). For
visual, auditory, and visual-auditory stimuli with expected reac-
tion times E[RTV ], E[RTA], and E[RTVA], respectively, crossmodal
response enhancement (CRE) is defined as
CRE =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
min(E[RTV ], E[RTA]) − E[RTVA]
min(E[RTV ], E[RTA]) · 100, for RTP,
and
E[RTV ] − E[RTVA]
E[RTV ] · 100, for FAP,
(7)
where the visual is again taken as target modality in the FAP case.
Replacing the means by the corresponding expressions from the
TWIN model Equation (5) results in
CRE =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
min(E[V], E[A])
−E[min(V,A)] + P(ICSP) · 
min(E[V], E[A]) + μ · 100, for CSP,
and
P(IFAP) · 
E[V] + μ · 100, for FAP.
(8)
Assuming further that visual and auditory intensity are matched,
such that E[A] = E[V], yields identical denominators in the
above ratios. Comparing the corresponding numerators then
reveals that response enhancement for CSP is at least as large
as that for FAP because (1) P(IFAP) ≤ P(IRTP) and (2) the term
min(E[V], E[A]) − E[min(V,A)], the amount of statistical facil-
itation, is always non-negative. Therefore, we have
CRE(CSP) ≥ CRE(FAP). (9)
This result holds if  > 0, in analogy to the result derived above
for crossmodal expected reaction time. Note that it is possible
to have an observed CRE(CSP) of zero even if  is different
from zero: it may have a negative amount just outweighing the
statistical facilitation effect.
3.3. THE EFFECT OF INTENSITY VARIATION ON CROSSMODAL
RESPONSE ENHANCEMENT
According to the TWIN model assumptions, a direct effect of
stimulus intensity only occurs in the peripheral processing chan-
nels. In later processing stages, direction and amount of cross-
modal interaction are assumed to be modulated by intensity only
via the outcome of first-stage processing, i.e., whether or not
integration takes place. Obviously, any intensity variation that
increases the likelihood that the peripheral processes terminate
within a time window will lead to an increase in the crossmodal
effect. This prediction has found ample empirical support. For
example, in CSP the largest RT facilitation is typically found when
stimulus intensities for both modalities are matched (“physiolog-
ical synchronicity”; e.g., Corneil et al., 2002). In FAP, intensity
effects become a bit more complex: first, increasing the inten-
sity of a relatively weak visual target stimulus will speed up
visual peripheral processing up to some minimum level, thereby
increasing the chance for the visual target to win the race. Thus,
the probability that the window of integration opens decreases,
predicting less crossmodal interaction. Increasing the intensity
of a non-target auditory stimulus, on the other hand, leads to
the opposite prediction: the auditory stimulus will have a better
chance to win the race and to open the window of integration,
hence predicting more crossmodal interaction, on average. If SOA
is varied as well, further distinctions can be made that will not be
considered here.
3.4. THE EMERGENCE OF INVERSE EFFECTIVENESS
In order to further examine the effect of intensity variation on
CRE in the TWIN model, we introduce some distributional
assumptions for the first stage processing times. These peripheral
processing times, V for the visual and A for the visual stimulus,
are assumed to have exponential probability distributions with
positive-valued parameters λV and λA, respectively. That is,
fV (t) = λV exp[−λV t],
fA(t) = λA exp[−λA t]
for t ≥ 0, and fV (t) = fA(t) ≡ 0 for t < 0. The exponential
assumption is primarily motivated by its mathematical simplic-
ity. Together with a Gaussian distribution assumption for second
stage processing time3 the resulting distribution is a mixture of
ex-Gaussian distributions for total reaction time, which has been
demonstrated to be a reasonably adequate description for many
empirically observed reaction time data (cf. Van Zandt, 2002).
For the probability of integration in FAP, we get
Pr(IFAP) = Pr(A < V < A + ω)
=
∫ ∞
0
fA(t)[FV (t + ω) − FV (t)] dt
=
∫ ∞
0
λA exp[−λAt]{exp[−λV t]
− exp[−λV (t + ω)] dt}
= λA
λA + λV {1 − exp[−λVω]}.
Similarly, for the probability of integration in CSP, we get
Pr(ICSP) = Pr(A < V < A + ω) + Pr(V < A < V + ω)
= λA
λA + λV {1 − exp[−λVω]
+ λV
λA + λA {1 − exp[−λAω]
3That is, a convolution of an exponential and a Gaussian distribution.; for
an alternative, replacing the Gaussian by the Wald distribution, see Schwarz,
2001.
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Assuming matching intensity levels again (that is, λV = λA ≡ λ)
this simplifies to
Pr(ICSP) = 1 − exp[−λω] ≡ 2 Pr(IFAP). (10)
It is now straightforward to compute the crossmodal response
enhancement expressions,
CRE =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(2λ)−1 + (1 − e−λω) · 
λ−1 + μ · 100, for CSP,
and
(1 − e−λω) · 
2(λ−1 + μ) · 100, for FAP.
(11)
Inspection of these expressions reveals that crossmodal response
enhancement, for both CSP and FAP, increases as a function of the
facilitation parameter ( > 0) and the window width (ω), but
decreases as a function of second stage processing time without
crossmodal interaction (μ), as one would expect.
Intriguingly, the effect of increasing intensity parameter λ is
different for the two paradigms: For FAP, CRE increases with λ
(for  > 0) no matter the values of the remaining parameters.
Note that this is no contradiction to the observations in the pre-
vious section since here we are assuming identical λ parameters
for target and non-target.
For CSP, however, CRE decreases with λ for many plausi-
ble values of the other parameters. Thus, TWIN’s prediction
here concurs with the “principle of inverse effectiveness” accord-
ing to which crossmodal facilitation is strongest when stimulus
strengths are weak or close to threshold level (Meredith and
Stein, 1986). Figure 1 illustrates this finding for specific param-
eters and shows that it holds across all values of window width.
Note that the difference between FAP and CSP with respect to
“inverse effectiveness” is mainly due to an additional term in the
numerator of the CRE equation (Equation 11) for CSP. This term,
1
2λ , is the amount of statistical facilitation, min(E[V], E[A]) −
E[min(V,A)]. Thus, here the “principle of inverse effectiveness”
is based on the fact that statistical facilitation becomes the smaller
the higher the intensity levels of the stimuli are. This observation
suggests that, at least in the domain of reaction time measure-
ment, “inverse effectiveness” may in part be a purely statistical
effect. Because this result has been derived under the auxiliary
assumption of exponentially distributed peripheral processing
durations and is limited to certain, though plausible, parame-
ter combinations, its remains to be shown whether it can be
generalized to a larger class of distributions.
4. OPTIMAL TIME WINDOWS FOR FAP AND CSP
The effect of adding information from another modality should
be particularly strong in an adverse environment, i.e., with a
low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). The prima facie plausibility of
the inverse effectiveness principle is actually based on this idea.
Within the TWIN framework, this would correspond to adjusting
the size of the time window with respect to SNR, i.e., widening it
for lower SNR values. Note that this differs from the above dis-
cussion of the effect of stimulus intensity where time window
size was assumed to be constant across trials. The perspective
taken now is that the adjustment of the time window is a top-
down process occurring only if there are long-term changes in
the environment as measured by SNR or, possibly, as a conse-
quence of changes in the cost/benefit of integration. This raises
the question of how an appropriate window size should be
determined.
Clearly, an infinitely large time window would lead to manda-
tory integration, and one could argue that this is what, e.g., a
sufficiently low SNR would require. A more elaborate response,
however, is based on the hypothesis that integrating crossmodal
information always involves a possibly implicit decision about
FIGURE 1 | TWIN predictions for crossmodal response enhancement
(CRE) for focused attention paradigm (FAP) (left panel) and crossmodal
signals paradigm (CSP) (right panel) as a function of time windowwidth
(ω). Each curve corresponds to a specific intensity parameter of the stimuli
demonstrating a “inverse effectiveness” for CSP. The peripheral processing
times for the auditory and visual stimuli are 1/λA = 1/λV equal to 20 (blue
line); 40 (green); 60 (red); 80 (cyan); and 100 (magenta). Mean second stage
processing time is μ = 100. Interaction parameter is  = 20.[all values in ms].
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whether or not two (or more) sensory cues originate from the
same event, i.e., have a common cause and that integration should
only occur in that case (e.g., Stein and Meredith, 1993; Koerding
et al., 2007). For example, in a predator-prey situation it may be
vital for the potential prey to recognize whether a sudden move-
ment in the dark is caused by a predator or a harmless wind gust.
If visual information is accompanied by some vocalization from
a similar direction, it may be adequate to respond to the poten-
tial threat by assuming that the visual and auditory information
are caused by the same source, i.e., to perform multisensory inte-
gration leading to a speeded escape reaction. On the other hand,
in a rich dynamic environment it may also be disadvantageous,
e.g., leading to a depletion of resources, or even hazardous, to
routinely combine information associated with sensory events
which—in reality—may be entirely independent and unrelated.
Colonius and Diederich (2010) introduced a decision-
theoretic approach for finding an optimal time window that
is in line with this setup. Subsequently, we have derived an
explicit expression for the optimal time window for the FAP case
(Colonius andDiederich, 2011). Here, we present an optimal time
window for CSP as well and discuss how predictions for MRE
under optimal performance differ between the two paradigms. To
keep this paper self-sustained, the next two sections summarize
our previously obtained results.
4.1. BASIC DECISION SITUATION AND OPTIMAL DECISION RULE
The basic decision situation is presented in a schematic manner
by the following payoff matrix (Table 1). It defines the gain (blue)
or cost (red) function U associated with the states of nature (C)
and the action (I) of audiovisual integration: Variable C indicates
whether visual and auditory stimulus information are generated
by a common source (C = 1), i.e., an audiovisual event, or by
two separate sources (C = 2), i.e., auditory and visual stimuli
are unrelated to each other. Variable I indicates whether or not
integration occurs (I = 1 or I = 0, respectively). The values U11
and U20 correspond to correct decisions and will in general be
assumed to be positive numbers, while U21 and U10, correspond-
ing to incorrect decisions, will be negative. The organism’s task is
to balance these costs and benefits of multisensory integration by
an appropriate optimizing strategy.
In order to derive an optimal decision rule, we assume
that a-priori probabilities for the events {C = i}i= 1,2 exist, with
Pr(C = 1) = 1 − Pr(C = 2). In general, an optimal strategy may
involve many different aspects of the empirical situation, like spa-
tial and temporal contiguity. As a simplifying starting point, the
temporal disparity between the “arrival times” of the unimodal
signals is assumed to be the only perceptual evidence utilized by
the organism. Thus, computation of an optimal time window will
be based on the prior probability of a common cause and the like-
lihood of temporal disparities between the unimodal signals; that
Table 1 | Payoff matrix for the basic decision situation.
Gain/Cost Integration (I = 1) No integration (I = 0)
Common source (C = 1) U11 U10
Separate sources (C = 2) U21 U20
is, we define the likelihood function f (t|C), where f denotes the
probability mass function or, if it exists, the density function of T
given C takes on a value. Using Bayes’ rule, we immediately have
the posterior probability of a common cause given the occurrence
of an arrival time difference t,
Pr(C = 1| t) = f (t|C = 1)Pr(C = 1)
f (t|C = 1)Pr(C = 1) + f (t|C = 2)Pr(C = 2) .
On each trial, in order to maximize the expected value E[U] of
function U in the payoff matrix (Table 1), the decision-maker is
to choose that action alternative (i.e., to integrate or not) which
contributes, on the average, more to E[U] than the other action
alternative. Introducing the likelihood ratio function
L(t) = f (t|C = 1)/f (t|C = 2),
results in the following decision rule (cf. Colonius and Diederich,
2010):
“If L(t) >
Pr(C = 2)
Pr(C = 1) ×
U2 0 − U2 1
U1 1 − U1 0 ,
integrate, otherwise do not integrate.” (12)
This decision rule implicitly defines a window that is optimal in
the sense of maximizing E[U]:
The optimal time window is the set of all values of absolute arrival
time differences {T = t} satisfying the inequality in the above deci-
sion rule (12).
The effect of the prior probability for a common cause on the
time window is immediately predictable from this decision rule:
Keeping the U-values constant, the expression on the right of
inequality (12) will decrease as P(C = 1) increases, implying an
extension of the time window.
4.2. COMPUTING AN OPTIMAL TIME WINDOW FOR FAP
In order to compute the optimal time window, we must spec-
ify the likelihood function. For two separate sources we assume
a uniform law,
f (t|C = 2) =
{
1/(t1 − t0) if t0 < t < t1,
0 otherwise,
. (13)
Here, t0, t1 are real numbers defining the observation interval, that
is, the interval of time limiting all possible ATDs due to the con-
struction of the trial length by the experimenter. Thus, under two
separate sources any arrival time difference is assumed to occur
with the same likelihood within the observation interval (t0, t1).
For a single source, we postulate4 that the likelihood function is
induced by the distribution of the peripheral processing times V
4It is important to keep in mind that this is an additional assumption not
directly following from the decision framework. It seems plausible, however,
given that in a typical environment visual and auditory information deriving
from a common source should occur more or less at the same point in time
(cf. Leone and McCourt, 2012).
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and A. For the FAP, given the independent exponential distribu-
tion assumption for V and A in TWIN, the distribution of arrival
time differences under a common source, V − A, can be shown to
be an asymmetric Laplace distribution (Colonius and Diederich,
2011):
f (t|C = 1) = λVλA
λV + λA ×
{
exp(−λVt) if t ≥ 0,
exp(λAt) if t < 0.
(14)
Note that the asymmetry derives from the asymmetry of the role
of the modalities in FA tasks (target vs. non-target). For t0 ≤ t ≤
t1, the likelihood ratio becomes5
L(t) = f (t|C = 1)/f (t|C = 2) = λVλA
λV + λA (t1 − t0)
×
{
exp(−λVt) if t ∈ (t0, t1) ∩ [0, t1),
exp(λAt) if t ∈ (t0, t1) ∩ (t0, 0] (15)
To simplify the exposition, in the following the ratio of utility dif-
ferences occurring in Equation 12 will be set equal to one. Thus,
according to the optimal decision rule, audiovisual integration
should be performed if and only if
L(t) >
1 − p
p
,
with p ≡ Pr(C = 1). Assuming matching intensity levels (λ ≡
λA = λV ), inserting the expression for L(t) from Equation 15,
and solving for t yields the following optimal time window for
t ∈ (t0, t1):{
t
∣∣∣∣ 1λ log
[
2 (1 − p)
λ (t1 − t0) p
]
≤ t ≤ 1
λ
log
[
λ (t1 − t0) p
2 (1 − p)
]}
(16)
provided that
2 (1 − p)
λ (t1 − t0) p ≤ 1. (17)
This latter condition guarantees that the left side of the interval is
non-positive and the right side is non-negative. For the width of
the optimal time window, we get immediately
ωopt =
(
2
λ
)
log
[
λ (t1 − t0)
2
p
1 − p
]
(18)
This is obviously an increasing function of the prior odds
p/(1 − p) and of the observation interval (t0, t1). Increasing
P(C = 1) leads to a widening of the time window, in this case
approaching infinity in a non-linear fashion. Moreover, the opti-
mal time window disappears for values of the prior below a
certain positive threshold value. Although the exact threshold
value depends on the experimental context (i.e., t1 − t0 and λ)
and may get close to zero, this prediction provides a potentially
strong model test: for a small enough value of P(C = 1) there
should be no multisensory integration effect at all.
5Note that for t outside of the observation interval the likelihood ratio remains
undefined.
4.3. COMPUTING AN OPTIMAL TIME WINDOW FOR CSP
The derivation of an optimal time window for CSP is analo-
gous to the FAP case, except that now the likelihood is defined
using the absolute arrival time difference of the unimodal signals,
T = |V − A|. Given the assumption of independent exponential
distribution for V and A in TWIN, the distribution of T under
a common source, then turns out to be a mixture of exponential
distributions:
Pr(|V − A| ≤ t) = Pr(V < A < V + t) + Pr(A < V < A + t)
FT(t|C = 1) =
∫ ∞
0
fV (v)[FA(v + t) − FA(v)] dv
+
∫ ∞
0
fA(a)[FV (a + t) − FV (a)] da
= λV
λA + λV
{
1 − exp[−λAt]
}
+ λA
λA + λV
{
1 − exp[−λV t]
}
.
Differentiation then yields the density for |V − A|:
fT(t|C = 1) = λVλA
λA + λV
{
exp[−λAt] + exp[−λV t]
}
, (19)
from which the likelihood ratio follows:
L(t) = (t1 − t0)fT(t) (20)
which is defined for t ∈ (t0, t1). It is easy to see that L(t) is mono-
tonically decreasing in t; thus, larger arrival time differences,
positive or negative, provide evidence in favor of two separate
sources rather than a single source, as is to be expected.
Inserting the expression for L(t) from Equation 20 and
solving for t yields the following optimal time window with
λ ≡ λA = λV :
{
t
∣∣∣∣ 0 ≤ t < 1λ log
[
p
1 − p λ (t1 − t0)
]}
(21)
for t ∈ (t0, t1). In order to exclude negative values of the
logarithm,
p ≥ [λ (t1 − t0) + 1]−1
must hold. The upper bound of the optimal time window is
identical to its length. As in FAP, it is obviously an increasing func-
tion of the prior odds p/(1 − p) and of the observation interval
(t0, t1). Increasing p = P(C = 1) leads to a widening of the time
window, approaching infinity in a non-linear fashion. Moreover,
as before, the optimal time window disappears for values of the
prior below a certain positive threshold value, providing a poten-
tial model test since for a small enough value of P(C = 1) there
should be no multisensory integration effect at all.
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4.4. CSP VS. FAP: COMPARING OPTIMAL TIMEWINDOWWIDTH
AND CRE
We are now in a position to compare both paradigms with respect
to their optimal time window width and the magnitude of their
multisensory response enhancement under optimality. For the
optimal time window size, ωopt,
ωopt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
2
λ
log
[
λ
2
p
1 − p s
]
for FAP;
1
λ
log
[
λ
p
1 − p s
]
for CSP
(22)
under the provision that the logarithmic term does not become
negative. Note that the length of the observation interval (s ≡
t1 − t0), being determined by the experimental setup, can be con-
sidered an inessential scaling factor. Not surprisingly, as observed
before, both optimal window widths increase with increasing
prior p for a common cause, approaching infinity for p → 1.
Figure 2 shows optimal time windowwidth for both FAP andCSP
as a function of the prior p. The width for FAP is larger than for
CSP nearly everywhere, except for rather small values (depend-
ing on the scaling factor s) of the prior, where the opposite holds.
This make sense intuitively: the probability of integration in FAP
is only half the size of the probability of integration in CSP (cf.
Equation 10). Thus, for a fixed and not too small prior, window
size in FAP must increase in order to match the probabilities of
integration in both paradigms6. Inspection of ωopt (Equation 22)
reveals that the effect of intensity parameter λ is more com-
plex. For small values of p it is non-monotonic (increasing, then
decreasing) and for larger p values ωopt it decreases for both FAP
and CSP. The latter observation may reflect a moderating effect of
intensity on window size once the window already is rather large.
6All other conditions being equal there is no a-priori reason why the optimal
probability of integration should differ between FAP and CSP.
FIGURE 2 | Optimal time window as a function of prior probability p
for a common source. Except for very small p, the optimal window size for
FAP is larger than for CSP, compensating for the lower probability of
integration in FAP compared to CSP. Parameters are λ = 0.03, s = 1s.
Inserting ωopt into the expressions for crossmodal response
enhancement (CRE) yields
CREopt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1/λ + μ)−1
[
1
2λ
+ 
(
1 − 1 − p
λ p s
)]
× 100
for CSP,
and
(1/λ + μ)−1 /2
[
1 −
(
2(1 − p)
λ p s
)2]
× 100,
for FAP.
(23)
We know from Ineq. 9 that CRE(FAP) cannot be larger than
CRE(CSP) when the parameters ω, λ,  ( > 0), and μ are all
identical for the two paradigms. However, since now the optimal
window widths are not identical for CSP and FAP, this order-
ing might no longer hold. Closer scrutiny of the above equations
reveals, however, that crossmodal response enhancement in CSP
still dominates the one in FAP when the other parameters are kept
the same. Moreover, for λ increasing without bound, CRE(CSP)
will become twice as large as CRE(FAP).
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Assuming exponential arrival time distributions, the framework
of the TWIN model has been specified here so that specific
quantitative predictions could be made comparing the FAP and
the CSP with respect to (1) the probability of multisensory
integration and (2) expected crossmodal response enhancement
(reaction time facilitation/inhibition). Moreover, introducing a
decision-theoretic framework for TWIN, the investigation could
be extended to comparing the CSP and FAP paradigms with
respect to their predicted optimal time windows. Glossing over
some of the required conditions concerning the specific parame-
ter values, the main findings were:
– the probability of crossmodal integration for CSP is twice the
probability of integration for FAP;
– crossmodal response enhancement (facilitation) for CSP is at
least as large as for FAP;
– TWIN model is consistent with the occurrence of a “inverse
effectiveness” under the CSP but not under FAP;
– within the decision-making framework for TWIN, explicit
expressions for the computation of time windows of optimal
width for both CSP and FAP have been derived;
– the optimal time window is larger for FAP than for CSP across
(nearly) all values of the prior probability (of a common source
for both modalities), thereby compensating for the smaller
probability of integration in FAP (see first item on this list)
– optimal crossmodal response enhancement (facilitation) for
CSP is larger than for FAP (or at least as large) even though
their optimal window widths differ.
The obvious next step will be to test these predictions experi-
mentally. Apart from a pilot study in our lab (cf. Colonius and
Diederich, 2012), we are not aware of any systematic empiri-
cal studies comparing FAP and CSP under matching stimulus
intensity levels. In particular, studies are needed varying the prior
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probability of a common source in order to test the above pre-
dictions concerning optimality (for FAP, see Van Wanrooij et al.,
2010). An unsolved issue, for example, is whether data that are
not consistent with optimality indicate sub-optimal behavior or
are simply due to participants’ subjective priors deviating from
the objective priors. Moreover, except for the first two items in
the above list, the current predictions have been derived under the
hypothesis of independent exponential arrival time distributions.
It remains to probe by further analysis whether or not these pre-
dictions can be generalized to other plausible distributions, e.g.,
gamma distributions.
A fundamental difference between the tasks in FAP and CSP
is that in the focused attention paradigm there must be a mecha-
nism to distinguish a target- from a non-target-modality stimulus
at a very early stage of processing, whereas in the CSP such a
mechanism is not required. This difference between paradigms
is in line with a recent suggestion in Kayser et al. (2010) of two
different modes of multisensory integration, one occurring in a
detection task where the response to weak stimuli is enhanced,
and another occurring in discrimination and identification tasks
where the precision and reliability of the responses are improved
(see also the commentary by Ghazanfar and Lemus, 2010). This,
in turn, suggests to probe whether, in focussed attention data,
one effect of the non-target-modality stimulus is to diminish the
variability of crossmodal reaction times, relative to the unimodal
variability. In the TWIN model, no explicit mechanism to distin-
guish target- from non-target modalities has been implemented
yet, but this may be called for if one attempts to investigate such
hypotheses.
Given that the TWIN model predicts changes in the (optimal)
time window as a function of the prior probability of a common
source, the basic question about the malleability of the time win-
dow arises. There are a number of recent studies, using other
experimental paradigms, that provide evidence for a dynamic
adaptation of the time window to changes in context. For exam-
ple, using a simultaneity judgment task, Powers and colleagues
showed that significant and lasting changes of perceived simul-
taneity (40% narrowing in the width of the window) can be
induced after a single day of training (Powers et al., 2009) and
are accompanied by decreases in BOLD activity within a net-
work of multisensory and unisensory areas (Powers et al., 2012)7.
Nevertheless, direct evidence in the context of the reaction time
paradigm will only be provided by the type of experimental tests
suggested above.
7For a recent review of the general area of perception of synchrony, see Keetels
and Vroomen (2012).
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